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A POLITICAL TRANSITION IN CHILE ?
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS ON THE LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY 1
Thomas C. Bruneau
Mary Mooney
Probably the most dramatic political phenomenon in countries
o-f Iberian heritage in recent decades is the transition -from
authoritarianism to liberal democracy. In the context o-f the
contemporary political histories o-f most o-f these countries, and
o-f our understanding o-f authoritarian regimes, the transitions in
Southern Europe, South America, and even the Philippines ar&
remarkable. While the consolidation o-f the Southern European
democracies seems likely, the prospects &re rather less
optimistic in South America (particularly Bolivia and Peru) and
the Philippines. Currently, however, virtually all o-f these
countries have popularly elected civilian governments, and in
several cases - Ecuador, Peru, Portugal and Spain - there have
been multiple national elections with di-f-ferent parties or
coalitions assuming power. A striking absence in this list o-f
transitions is Chile; in South America only Chile and Paraguay
remain under authoritarian regimes. As Paraguay has known
virtually nothing but dictatorship, with General Stroessner
ruling sine 1954, there is little surprise. Chile is a di-f-ferent
situation. Our purpose here is to analyze the absence o-f a
transition and evaluate prospects for the -future.
Despite Chile's long history o-f democratic government,
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General Pinochet, remains the supreme ruler today, nearly a decade
and a half after- the coup of 11 September 1973. Indeed,
Pinochet's regime is the longest in Chilean history. While
repression has tended to decrease (as would be anticipated given
the high level during the first years after the violent coup and
exile of activists) the regime remains under his personal and
arbitrary control. The Congress remains closed, political
parties are still either outlawed or 'in recess', there are no
elections at the national or even municipal levels, and the
carabineros and army remain ready to put down demonstrations in
favor of a return to democracy. Now, however, there are a
variety of indications -events, processes, and suggestions-
which may finally culminate the alternate waves of hope and
despair that characterise the political opposition and much of
the population. Some of the more significant of these are as
f o.l 1 ows.
Important external actors are encouraging a transition.
Pope John Paul II visited Chile for six days in early April,
1987. He was the first figure of international stature to visit
the country since 1973 and this was the first visit ever by a
Pope. Even before arriving he criticized the dictatorship, and
in speeches stressed such themes as democracy and participation.
These statements in and of themselves were not, and could not
have been, expected to lead to anything immediately. However,
they provide support for those favoring a transition by a highly
regarded international figure whom General Pinochet has not
criticised. The other most important external actor is the
Uniied States government. The US, having been involved in the
demise o-f the Allende government, has been distancing itself from
the Pinochet regime and encouraging a transition to democracy.
Added to the continuing prohibition on military assistance to
Chile and other measures imposed by the US Congress, are the
stat ements and actions eminating from the Reagan administration.
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter—Ameri can Affairs, Elliot
Abrams has stated that a transition 1 ?; necessary and Ambassador
Barnes has conveyed this message in Chile. Internally, there
are also indications of increased activity. The representatives
of the Navy, Air Force, and Carbineiros on the Junta have come
out in favor of the next president being a civilian ana
relatively young. Since March of 19E7 four committees for free
elections have been formed, and public opinion surveys indicate
broad support for free elections. The parties of the Left,
outlawed and otherwise, have recently formed the Izquierda Unida
or "United Left" which replaces the earlier MDF', Popular
Democratic Movement. And, reminiscent of the Acuerdo Nacional of
19BT>, there is again an attempt by a broader group of political
parties from the "nationalists" on the right to the socialists on
the left. to forge a common opposition platform and party, and to
oppose Pinochet, the most likely candidate, in the plebiscite.
This is in response to a highly pressurized, authoritarian
context where there is a generalized expectation that the
institutional framework which is currently operative in Chile,
stipulating a plebiscite by September 1989 to certify (or
possibly not) the single candidate chosen by the junta as the
next president, will be brought -forward to September 1988.
Do these activities presage a political transition? It is
our evaluation that 6\ transition is currently unlikely, barring
an unforseen major change such as the death of Pinochet or a
natural catastrophe. In order to elaborate the analysis behind
this conclusion, it is necessary to first review some of the main
features o-f the recent experiences o-f political transitions. 2
Some o-f these experiences a.re less relevant than others. In
Argentina, Greece, and Portugal the main, or perhaps catalytic,
factor making -for a transition was de-feat (or expected defeat in
the case o-f Portugal) in war. This could have been relevant i f
Argentina chose to fight Chile over the Beagle Channel ratner
than Britain over the Malvinas in 1982. In Uruguay, the defeat
of the military government in the 1980 plebiscite, followed by
the defeat of their candidates in the party primaries in 1982 set
in motion the process of transition. Pinochet, however, won a
similar plebiscite the same year as he had the consultation in
1978. In Ecuador and Peru the military governments themselves
attempted reforms. When these did not work out the unity of the
armed forces, already tenuous, was threatened and the governments
popularity among significant classes in society plummeted even
further. Consequently, their hold on power diminished
substantially. In the Philippines much of the reason for the
transition can be found in the absence or weakness of political
organizations, either of the Marcos regime or the opposition.
This meant that, the ant 1 -Marcos forces were able to -focus their
campaign without concern -for satisfying pre-existing political
agendas. While -facilitating the transition itself this weakness
has made consolidation problematic.
None o-f these cases are comparable to Chile: there is no
de-feat in war, Pinochet has been success-ful in institutionalizing
his rule on the basis o-f the 1980 plebiscite, he has never sought
re-forms but rather their elimination and has been supported by
significant classes, and there is a very high degree o-f political
organization and mobilization. Through the process of
elimination, the most similar cases o-f transition to the
situation in Chile Are Brazil and Spain. Through a brief review
o-f these roughly comparable cases we may be able to better
understand the prospects -for Chile.
In Brazil the political transition was begun by F'resident
Geisel in 1974, ten years after the coup which brought the
military to power. It was initiated from above by a regime which
had seen tremendous economic growth, but where the terms of
trade were turning against Brazil with the drastic increase in
the price of oil in 1973. There is still speculation as to why
the transition, which was termed "distensao" or relaxation, was
begun. The most convincing arguments center on Geisel 's
intention to broaden the support of the regime following the
period of rapid growth, which did not decrease extremely unequal
distribution of income but did see the further elaboration of a
dynamic entrepreneurial elite. This elite increasingly perce ved
the state apparatus as a hindrance to its economic and political
actions. 3 Further, under his predecessor, President Medici,
there was extensive use of repression which resulted both in the
virtual elimination of threats -from the le-ft and alienation of
even the middle classes, whose children may have been hit by the
increasingly uncontrollable security apparatus. The transition
began without pressure "from below either from unions or the
semi-official opposition party MDB (Brazilian Democratic
Movement) operating in the largely powerless Congress wnich
remained open virtually throughout the military regime.
Between 1974 and approximately 1982 the main dynamic
centered on the regime promoting liberalization (elimination of
most censorship, amnesty for political exiles and prisoners, a
party reform, etc.) but seeking to control the tempo and content
of the transition through intimidation and constitutional
engineering, and on the expanding opposition participating but
demanding more speed and voice in the overall process. While the
focus of the opposition was the MDB, and after the party reform
of 1979 the other three or four opposition parties, it also
included organizations such as the Catholic Church, Order of
Brazilian Lawyers, the "union opposition
,
and a myriad of
emerging civic associations. 'Civil society' did emerge and
played a role in the transition at a late stage. This role was
most obvious in the elections for the federal Congress and state
assemblies, which were held regularly, if constrained, throughout
the military regime, and in the popular demonstrations for direct
elections in 1984. It played only a secondary role, however, and
was not the critical -factor at any point o-f the transition.
Indeed, the -final stage of the transition involved a complex
process o-f negotiation between a small group in the PMDB around
the venerated and reliable political -figure, Tancredo Neves, and
the regime. Neves was able to use the regime's mechanisms,
specifically the Electoral College, to bring the PMDB to power,
but only after the details were discussed and guarantees made to
the military resulting in what must be termed a 'conservative
transition'. The military exited direct governing roles and
civilian politicians came to the fore.
Since early 1985, when Jose Sarney replaced the deceased
Neves as President, there have been recurring waves of political
mobilization due to the serious economic situation, as well as
elections in Novemher 1985 for mayors and November 1986 for the
Constituent Assembly, Congress, state assemblies, and governors,
and some focus on the Constituent. Assembly itself. So far,
however, despite all of this activity the Brazilian transition
remains conservative, negotiated at the elite level, and with
little involvement of or impact from the general population.
While there is indeed significant popular mobilization, promoted
by the Catholic Church, unions, the PT or Workers Party, and
civic associations, there is limited contact between them and the
centers of political power.
In Spain as well the political transition was initiated from
above and controlled by the regime through the most critical
period which extended -from Franco's death in November 1975 until
the first general elections and local elections were held under
the new Constitution in March and April 1979. 4 On the death of
Franco, King Juan Carlos was sworn in as prescribed under
Franio's law. When Premier Carlos Arias, a -former premier under
Franco, was unable to gain acceptance o-f his proposals •for
limited democracy, he was dismissed by the King in July 1976 and
replaced by Adolf o Suarez who initiated the many elements of the
political transition. Significantly, he used the instruments of
the old regime - the Cortes, National Council of the Movement and
the Council of the Realm - to transform the very nature of the
regime. Once initiated, the splintered and weak political
opposition began to come together, as in the Coordinacion
Democrat ica in 1976, but it remained weak. For example, despite
the campaign for mass abstention waged by most of the opposition
(and the campaign for a negative vote waged by the most
conservative forces of the old regime) more than 70'/. of the
electorate backed the? Reform Law in a referendum. This Law was
passed by the Francoist Cortes, on the initiative of the Suarez
government, which dissolved the Assembly and formally opened the
way for general elections. In short, the Cortes, which had been
appointed during the Franco regime, voted for its own
el imi nation.
As in Brazil, the regime gradually opened political space,
or liberalized, by legalizing political parties (February to
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April 1977) and decreeing amnesty (in March and October 1977).
The first general election of the Parliament, in June 1977,
selected the Congress o-f Deputies and a Senate,, and had as its
main -function the dra-fting o-f a constitution. During its work in
late 1977 and throughout 1978 the defining characteristic: o-f
this process was undoubtedly the consensus which the party
leaders promoted by compromise, demobilization of the bases, and
elite understandings. In what has been termed "the politics of
consensus" the constitution was framed, which was approved in
referendum in December 1978, but two of the main actors, the UCD
and PCE came apart in the process due to their neglect of the
links with their bases. 5 Since 1979 the democratic regime has
been consolidated and power has shifted from the UCD to the PSQE
,
elected in 1982 and reelected in 1986.
In the early, and probably most important stages of the
Spanish transition, from 1976 through 1979, and continuing in the
Brazil transition until the present, we see a process whereby an
old regime transforms itself, through its own ] egal mechanisms
which of course Are not static. In Spain this was through the
Leyes Fundamental e-; and in Brazil through the Constitution of
1967, as (frequently) amended. In neither case did the old regime
break down due to some external fiasco, such as defeat in war, or
pressure from 'civil society' or the political opposition.
Rather, the initiative was on the part of the regime which then
allowed space for a political opposition to participate and help
define the form and content of a new regime. It must be
stressed, then, that there was willingness on the part of the
regime leaders to liberalize, i -f not to democratize, and
political mobilization was limited. Not only were the established
political institutions, the Cortez in Spain and the Electoral
College in Brazil, utilized -for key aspects o-f the transition,
but there was substantial attention to -formal legality. We will
see in Chile that there is no willingness by President F'inochet
to begin a process o-f liberalization. There are other important
st?ctors which are seeking to initiate a transition. Due to the
fragmented nature o-f these sectors, however, and -fundamental
differences regarding not only strategy but also the nature of
the Chile they envision, they are unable to offer a viable
alternative to Pinochet.
Pre?: Ld§Qt_E!LD9£b§t
In identifying the key actors in Chilean politics, the
firs: and foremost is Augusta Pinociet Ugarte, President of the
Republic, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Commander
of the Army. What sets him apart from other actors to be dealt
with here is his almost singular belief that he is the ideal
government candidate for the upcoming plebiscite. For Pinochet,
the plebiscite is seen merely as another national consultation,
the third, that will provide Chileans with an opportunity to
express their approval or disapproval of the regime's 15-year
record. What he expects, of course, is what was expected in
1980: that he will remain in power for another eight years to
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fully implement a new "protected" democracy according to -f he
Constitution. This would be a total o-f sixteen years as
constitutional president, in addition to the previous seven as
the predominant member o-f the Junta. I f he loses the plebiscite,
he will still serve as president -for an additional year, at which
time there will be -free, competetive elections.
With the date o-f the plebiscite expected to be announced
-for September 1988 rather than in 1989, it is not surprising that
there is evidence suggesting that his campaign is in -full swing.
To (his end, and having successfully weathered the visit by the
Pope in April, 1987, he has made important changes in his
cabr.net. In contrast to the Pope's message o-f reconciliation, the
charges have not only given hardliners a more prominent role but
alsi. provided Pinochet with an efficient team for pleasing regime
supporters and ensuring a successful outcome. The most important
of the new figures in the "campaign cabinet" is actually an old
one
;
Sergio Fernandez, returning to his former post as Minister
of J he Inter l or
.
Fernandez is considered the very essence of loyalty (and
manageabilty) to Pinochet, as well as the spearhead behind bcDth
the successful consultation of 1978 and the constitutional
plebiscite of 1980, and intimately knowledgeable on matters
dealing with the Constitution and its implementation. Most
Chileans remember him as the most "military" of the civilian
ministers, a reputation that comes from his tough response to
dis?,ent as well as from the official coverup of the Letelier-
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Mo-f-fitt assassination in September 1976. However, as the
director o-f one o-f the opposition bi-weeklies suggests, this
reputation may be his greatest asset at the moment - since no one
expects any great advances -for the opposition under Fernandez,
anything he does o-ffer will put the regime, and thus Pinochet, in
more -favorable light than would otherwise be the case. 6 In
Fact, in one o-f his -first statements as minister, Fernandez said
that contrary to his hardliner image, he would be willing to meet
with the political parties that con-form to the consti tui onal
criteria, that he sees the possibility o-f the Catholic Church
playing an intermediary role in the transition process, and is
concerned about the situation o-f the remaining exiles.
His appointment is understood as a clear message that,
barring an extremely heavy registration turnout, the government
has no intention o+ modifying its constitutional agenda. With
regard to the political parties, one o-f his moves probably will
be to make it easier -for the small right-wing parties to register
by reducing the requisite number o-f signatures. Currently, 14
political entities have applied -for -full recognition, almost all
o-f them supportive o-f the regime, and not one has been able to
secure the 32,000 signatures necessary to complete the second
stage o-f the process. 7 Again it is likely that he will try to
consolidate the support o-f Renovacion Nacional which is the most
sigrii
-f icant party supporting the regime, and neutralize the
largest and still most widely-recognized and supported party,
the Christian Democrats (PDC) . The regime's ongoing strategy o-f
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keeping the opposition divided with o-f-fers o-f some recognition is
working. The government sees the PDC as more amenable now to
further o-f-fers given the election o-f conservative Patricio Alwyn
as party president and the party's refusal to publicly ally
itself with the latest le-ftist -front, Izquierda Unida.
Another notable change in the cabinet was the exit o-f
Javier Cuadros as Secretary General o-f the Government. Though
seemingly popular with Pinochet, his extremely confrontational
sty e with all o-f the opposition, including the Church and PDC,
was becoming counterproductive -for the presidential candidate.
The key figures remaining are the "Chicago Boys" Sergio Mel nick
at GDEPI. AN (Oficina de PI ani f i caci on Nacional which, incidentally
has its plans already drawn up for 1987-1997, specifically
directed toward the continuation of the regime) , Hernan Buchi as
Minister of Finance, and Juan Antonio Guzman in Education.
Overall, the changes strengthen Pinochet's personal position
within i he government and the ultraliberal economic policies
followed particularly since 1984. This gives Pinochet more
leverage for the kind oi approach to the opposition that he is
best at controlling - that of a more acrimonious confrontation.
The discovery of rockets aimed at the government palace and the
"confrontations" between government troops and members of the
extreme left in June 1987 enhance his oft expressed warning that
the only possible alternative to his continuation as President is
that of chaos of the 1970-1973 era: where political parties,
because of their self-interest and inconsistency created a
13
political vacuum that brought the country to the brink ot
disaster. 8
Pinochet has not been restrained in his own attacks on the
parties. He has spoken vehemently against the people trusting
"democrats, with cristian surnames, that hand things over to
communism" as well ,<s "renewed" socialists who try to "change
their position with democratic phraseology which looks like
moderation, that seeks to create an image of another
socialism... with the intention o-f -fooling the people". He
justi-fys his own role as "coming -from above ... God put me here-
it is Providence, destiny ...". 9 By all indications, this
attitude is becoming only slightly more conciliatory as in his
September 11 speech celebrating -fourteen years o-f the regime, he
distinguished politicians who are willing to -follow the road o-f
understanding as opposed to the Izquierda Unida (mentioned by
name) -for whom he has nothing but the "mano dura". 10
Pinochet has also projected himsel-f by extensive public
appearances throughout the country, particularly in connection
with the government's campaign to supply a record number o-f
housing units, primarily to lower income -families. The
ceremonies -for handing over the keys to the new homeowners Are
elaborate, attended not only by the mayor and other local
o-f-ficials, but by the Minister o-f Housing and often by the
President himsel-f. This receives extensive coverage on the
television news programs. The public see a grand-fatherly
Pinochet, without dark glasses, handing over the keys to dozens
14
o-f working class Chilean -families.
The? presence o-f the mayors at these ceremonies is part o-f
what is known as the National Plan of Civic Action (PNAC) by
which Pinochet is involving the mayors throughout the country in
his re-election process. Alberto Cardemi 1
,
subsecretary o-f the
Ministry o-f the Interior, denied that the mayors (who are
appointed by the minister) are overstepping their administrative
role in aiding the government's "legitimate desire -for re-
election". But it seems clear that, with the line oi command
directly to the President vi^ the governor and intendent, they
have little choice but to commit their resources and their
authority t jward this goal. One o-f the clearest indications o-f
this has been in the elimination o-f more than 8,000 teaching
positions by late 1987. Those selected -for dismissal -frequently
have been precisely those teachers who have been politiclaly
active. 11 It is likely that, despite complaints -from the
opposition, the mayors will continue to -follow this broad and
aggressive i nterpretaton o-f their powers.
This highlights another instrument to enhance the likelihood
o-f success in the plebiscite, that o-f controlled access to the
use o-f television. Theoretically, legally constituted parties (o-f
which there are none at the moment) will have ample access to
airtime. The cost, however, is prohibitive: 18-21 million pesos
(approximately $90,000) -for a 6-minute spot aired -four times a
month. This makes it virtually impossible -for any party to use
this; key medium.
Finally, there is the manner in which the registration
process itself is being handled. It is necessary as electoral
lists were destroyed after the coup. In the constitutional
plebiscite of 1980, registration was not required, helping to
quickly push through the document with little scrutiny by the
public. The electoral population is approximately 8,400,000
Chileans (45% of whom are new voters) but at the current rate of
inscription (until October 1987), only five million will have
regi sterec by June 1988 which would be the cutoff date for a
September 1988 vote.
The process is being done manually rather than by readily
available computer processes, registration stations are only open
for three hours a day, and each voter must obtain a new identity
card which costs the equivalent of a da v 's wages for labourers.
To these factors are added: a high level of public: skeptic: ism
that the plebiscite will be fair or that anything will change;
and the fact that military personnel have already been registered
and as "public employees", a move to confuse political analysis
after the vote. Pressure is also being put on othcer employees in
public offices to register, with strong implications concerning
which way to vote. One sees then the benefits to the government
candidate of the registration campaign.
Pinochet, of course, is not without support among the
population. The basic fact that he survived the disastrous
effects of his economic policies in the early eighties attests
not only to his ability to adapt quickly but to his support
16
among sectors. Various apparently credible opinion polls show
that he can command between 13 and 20"/. o-f the vote. In terms of
supportive organised entities, the mcDst numerous is probably
CEMA-Chile, headed by his wife, which is an organization o-f
women's clubs (centros de madres) which has aver 10,000 local and
very active groups throughout, the country. 12
In terms o-f political parties, the Avanzada Nacional
has expressed its strong, unconditional support to Pinochet as
the most appropriate candidate. Many mayors and members o-f the
Armed Forces Are sympathetic ( i -f not outright members) and others
Are -former members o-f the extreme right-wing group known as
Patria y Libertad. 13 The party de-fines itsel-f as a -faith-ful
follower o-f the National Security Doctrine and has also been
adan ant in calling -for the application o-f Article 8 o-f the
Con?: t i tut i on which proscribes any individual or party from the
"distribution and propagation of any doctrine that undermines the
family, advocates violence, class struggle or a totalitarian
concept of the state and the law." It in effect legalizes the
exclusion of the political left and has been used to justifiy
violence against them.
However, Pinochet is facing more opposition today than he
ever has and it is coming from several sectors. It can be
anal /zed according to various criteria but the basic and the most
important is that which separates those who wish to see a
continuation of the regime with little or no change other than
that of Pinochet himself, from those who desire more fundamental
17
changes in regime structure and policy. Within the latter group,
or rather conglomeration o-f groups, a -further and very
significant division exists between those who want the
transition process limited to political negotiation, i.e. elite
politics, and those who believe that the only legitimate and
effective transition will take place with the broader
participation o-f the grass-roots, in other words, social
mobilization as well.
The_Junta_and_the_Armed_Fgrces
The closest to Pinochet among those who wish to see him
withdraw -from the political scene while maintaining the system
intact, are the other members o-f the Junta, o-f which he is the
president. First to come out publicly and clearly state his
position was Admiral Jose Merino. Just weeks after the Pope's
visit, he stated that the most appropriate government candidate
would be a civilian, pre-ferably younger (@ 52) and clearly one
who upholds the values o-f the regime and nation. Soon
a-fterwards, General Fernando Matthei o-f the Air Force concurred
with Merino's opinion and reconfirmed his position that the Air
Force would retire -from government in 1989. Finally, the head o-f
the Carabineros (el Orden), General General Rodol-fo Stange added
his endorsement after returning from a personal trip to Germany
where he had met informally with Matthei. If there is no
consensus within the Junta, for the choice of candidate must be
unanimous, the decision on a government candidate rests with the
National Security Council 14 where Pinochet may stand a better
18
chance given that he appoints most o-f the members of that body.
It has been suggested that Pinochet retire -First and run as a
civilian. As president he would then assume the role o-f
Commander-i n-Chi e-f o-f the Armed Forces.
Within the Chilean Armed Forces Pinochet still enjoys
considerable support although the situation is becoming more
complex. The results o-f several public opinion polls carried
out within the last year have not been lost on the military
brass. For example, one such survey, done by SUR and published
in Ei_MecuriLg, indicates that only 18"/. would prefer a government
like that o-f the present one, even with re-forms, -for the -future.
This, o-f course, brings into question the role o-f the military
itsel-f
.
The Armed Forces have been a very significant part of the
regime, even more so than was the case in the Brazilian or
Argentinian military governments. Overall, the ratio of soldiers
per 1000 population has been significantly greater, and
increasing, in Chile at 9.0 in 1974 to 10.4 in 1984 compared to
only 5.9 and 5.8 respectively in Argentina, for instance. 15 The
Army under Pinochet quickly became the dominant actor after the
coup and has remained so since. 16 For example, of the 56
military members of the cabinet during the past fourteen years
(of a total of 118 ministers), 23 have been Army, 12 Navy, 12 Air
Force and 9 Police. At the level of subsecretar i es , the Army has
supplied 25.4 '/. while the Navy in comparison, only 4.5 "/.. C0RF0
,
the national development corporation has almost always been under
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the direction of an Army general, while within the enterprises
under its control, the total military involvement at the level o-f
directorship has been 54: 39 Army, 8 Navy, 3 Air Force, and 4
Pol ice.
The overall result has been the vert i cal i zat i on o-f the state
apparatus and power, particularly under the Army and Pinochet
himself. This is even more visible in the prevalent use of high
command active duty Army personnel as regional intendents (11 of
the 13, while 1 is Navy and 1 Air Force); and in the role o-f
governor. This latter- combines civil authority and troop command
in one person. And in this role in 1986, 28 of the 50 governors
were Army officers, 2 Navy 2 Police and none from the Air Force.
This has greater significance when it is seen that since 1973,
when the Army and the Police had approximately the same number of
men in uniform, today the Army has increased by 21,000 while the
police are down 2,000.
The involvement of the military, and especially the Army,
does not end there. In addition to the rectorships of several key
universities over the years, diplomatic posts have often been
Pinochet's gifts to loyal "uni f ormados" . Between 1973 and 1986,
Chilean representatives in other nations and in international
organizations have been military in 47.5"/. of the appointments and
of these, 48.7"/. have been Army. In terms of other benefits,
military personnel live in special neighbourhoods with their own
hospitals, etc. and they receive good pensions. Only 2.6X of
retired uniformed personnel receive pensions classified in the
20
lowest percentile compared to 71.37. of the civilian population,
while 87. o-f civilians are in the highest category, 257. of the
military are -found there. Significant as well, is the increase
in the number of generals in the Army from 19 in 1966 to 57 in
1987. Pinochet is not reticent to retire less than supportive
generals and replace them with younger men who have received
their higher commands under him and are more imbued with the
tenets of the National Security Doctrine that constitutes the
basic philosophy of the regime.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that even the Army
is a monolith in terms of its attitudes toward the succession.
The fact that approximately a dozen generals are being replaced
or retiring early attests this. Part of the question likely
involves the desire to recuperate full professional status and
prestige for the Armed Forces. There is a feeling that the Armed
Forces would be taking a great risk in losing the plebiscite if
indeed Pinochet is the government candidate. This would not bode
well for them in terms of an eventual return to the barracks
without retribution for their role in the regime. General Gordon
is probably a good example of this: his loyalty to the regime is
unquestionable, as is that of his support for Pinochet should he
decide to run as a civilian. But he has made clear that he
believes the military must exit government by 1989 to preserve
their institutional integrity.
Id§_yQited_States
This is very close to the position of the United States
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government. As part o-f his -final visit to Chile, General John
Galvin, Commander-i n-Chi ef o-f SOUTHCOM, met with several high
level military officials (many o-f whom were reported to have
expressed dissatisfaction with the military's role in the burning
of the two youths last year) and said he felt they were
supportive of a return to democratic government. 17 The
continuation of Pinochet is now seen as one of the key obstacles
to what is most fundamental to US interests - stability. Last
year, Elliot Abrams stated that "Chile is ...approaching a
crucial turning point... It could go either way, toward democracy
or ...toward the chaos that would accompany a government whose
legitimacy is broadly questioned at home and abroad" 18. The US
feels that the Chilean military has a key role to play in
promoting stability in the Southern Cone, and that Pinochet will
have to go. A more legitimate government and more professional
role for the Armed Forces would allow closer relations and
exchanges between the two militaries which are now extremely
limited. 19
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Robert Gelbard, reinforced the view noting that "It is clear that
the climate for investment in Chile is subject to growing
uncertainty given that the plebiscite is approaching" and
Pinochet is still posturing to be the government candidate. 20
This does not deny that there have been some positive
developments in the US frame of reference, such as the attempts
by the centre and centre-left parties to minimize their
association with the Communist Party (PC). This is most evident
in their almost unamimous call -for registration in the electoral
lists as opposed to the early PC refusal to so. Again, in the
election o-f the new national directorate o-f the Christain
Democratic Party the victory o-f the conservative slate under
Patricio Alywin, although by a relatively small margin,
rein-forces the move o-f that party away -from supporting social
mobilization as a strategy against the government. This is
reassuring to the State Department since any strategy that
involves street demonstrations, strikes, work stoppages and so on
only opens up the possibility o-f -further participation by the
marxi st le-ft.
US government statements discredit Pinochet personally. For
example, as a result o+ the re-opening o-f the Letel i er-Mo-f -f i tt
case in Washington early in 1987, evidence pointing to the
direct involvement o-f Pinochet in the authorization of the
murders has received a great deal o-f press in Chile. Further, in
the US calling -for the expulsion o-f two high-ranking military
officers from Chile rather than issuing an extradiction order
(i.e. the political rather than judicial route) it has forced
Pinochet to issue a public refusal and set himself up for
greater criticism within Chile.
While Pinochet began to undergo the pressure of the Junta
members declaring in favor of a civilian. Ambassador Barnes
publicly criticized the "glacial" pace of the investigation into
the burning of the two youths, as well as the promotion while the
investigation was still going on, of the officer accused of
responsibility in the incident. 21 Finally, the US has re-fused
to grant a visa to Pablo Rodriguez, a -former leader o-f "Patria y
Libertad", which is a source o-f Pinochet's support. The
combination o-f these -factors has produced -for Pinochet a complex
and somewhat di-f-ficult situation -for perpetuating his personal
rule.
EfJtt i.es_gf _the_Ri_ght
Given the high degree o-f political party i ndent 1 -f i cat i on in
Chile, one would expect to -find political parties that are
supportive o-f this option as well, le. a conservative transition
wherein the rider is changed but not the horse. As we have seen,
Avanzada Nacional occupies the space on the extreme right in -full
support o-f Pinochet continuing. However, there is not a strong
democratic right, i.e. one -favoring a political transition. The
traditional right in general, though still loyal to the regime,
has little influence. There is a desire to see Pinochet leave
but this is countered by an even stronger -fear o-f social conflict
and economic instability i -f greater social mobilization becomes
part o-f the plebiscite process. And because o-f its relative
isolation -from the regime, the right does not seem to have a
viable mediating role to play with the rest o-f the opposition.
There have been numerous efforts to remedy this predicament.
The most notable attempt to re-unite and thereby strengthen the
right has been via its less democratic elements, in the
formation of the Renovacion Nacional party (RN) comprised of UDI
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(Union Democratica Independiente) , MUN (Movimiento de Accion
Nacional) and Onorfo Jarpa's FDT (Frente de Traba jadores) , with
the express purpose o-f providing an "heir" to the present regime.
Because Sergio Fernandez was one o-f the -founders o-f UDI (though
not currently a member) , it is expected that this party will be
able to establish closer ties to government in the near -future.
The RN ' s very active policy -favoring the -firm application of
Article 8 and in strongly supporting the continuation o-f the
current economic and political policies makes it very amenable to
other regime supporters - the Junta, large entrepreneurs, and the
military. The RN does not see Pinochet as essential. At the
very least, it -feels that he should separate the -functions o-f the
presidency and the Armed Forces in order to preserve the
integrity of the latter.
Renovacion Nacional, however, has to resolve some basic
internal differences before it can offer a viable role in any
transition. The MUN and FNT favor free elections as the best way
to extradite the Armed Forces from their involvement in the
government, while UDI members support the plebiscite as a more
secure method of preventing greater polarization that would
encourage mobilization of the left. UDI was also the only one of
the three which refused to sign the Acuerdo Nacional of 1985, and
sees even the PDC as too "socialist". It is therefore in the
unenviable position of being neither really of the government nor
establishing significant ties to the rest of opposition. 22
The other major member of the political right is the
Partido Nacional which identifies itself as more independent of
the government ana its authoritarian policies. It sees the
current government as Pinochet's personal system and certainly
not representative o-f the legitimate right in the country. It
signed the Acuerdo Nacional in 1985 and is more -flexible than RN
in its range o-f acceptable political allies which extend as -far
as the Izquierda Cristiana, breako-f-f -from the PDC. Its
president, Patricio Philips states that exluding the left will
only bring civil violence. The part> clearly favors free
elections or, failing that, negotiations between the Armed Forces
and the democratic political parties to select a consensus
candidate for the plebiscite. Though clearly against Pinochet
prolonging his stay, the PN feels that he would be the lesser of
two evils if the opposition cannot produce a viable alternative.
Perhaps the most important change that has occurred within
the opposition is the more definite articulation of a sector
that, in contrast to the above - other members of the Junta,
sectors of the military, US government, and the few small parties
of the right - supports not only a change of the rider but also
of the horse, i.e. the regime itself and many of the policies it
espouses. It must be remembered that the fourteen vears plus
since the coup have seen the creation of a new regime, an
economic system in many ways radically different from that of
pre-1973, and an increasingly fragmented society with a clear
tendency towards polarization.
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Within this sector there are several distinctions. The most
important is between, on the one hand, those who feel that
political mobilization, -focused in the campaign -for -free
elections, is sufficient and indeed the only road to follow in
order to expect any kind of negotiations with the Armed Forces
re their exit; and, on the other, those who are convinced that no
significant change will take place without a combination of both
political and social mobilization, with a high level of
involvement of the masses.
I!j£_Q§D£§!1
Exemplifying the first position are the Christian
Democrats, at least as far as the new national directorate is
representative of the party. The F'DC is still, after a 14-year
hiatus of legal political activity, the most readily identified
and most popular political party, even among the youth. 23 In
the first contested election for its president in several years,
Patricio Alwyn received about 60 7. of the vote, reflecting
internal differences the effects of which remain to De seen.
According to Genaro Arriagada, there was a last-ditch effort by
some members to come up with a consensus candidate but they were
not successful. This would not only have minimized divisions
within the party itself but also avoided a lot of public
anomosity based on the F'DC ' s perceived lack of concern for
opposition unity in general. 24
Under Alwyn, the emphasis is on the campaign to register
voters for what is hoped will be a multiple candidate election
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instead of a plebiscite, though this would necessitate
constitutional revision. Also, despite significant internal
opposition, particularly -from the youth wing o-f the party, the
directorate has decided to go ahead and seek legal recognition as
a party. Other parties feel this is a dangerous step. Of all
parties, the PDC is probably the only one that has the
possibility of meeting the heavy requirements and thus give
credibility to a system that they want extensively revised. Juan
Hamilton, a national advisor of the PDC, said in response that it
is only a pragmatic move to take advantage of all available
political space. 25 In terms of political alliances, it sees
possibilities at the moment for agreements with parties that
extend from the PN to the PS-Nunez socialist faction. The PDC has
not given much support to the sporatic efforts by other social
groups regarding national strikes and mass demonstrations, and
cannot be expected to change this under Alwyn.
Many members of the PDC, however, are working at other
important levels one of which is that of gremios and unions.
Although the number of gremios is not great, they take on more
significance given the fact that for many years they were
controlled by government appointed directors, and there are no
other areas of public life where elections take place. Thus
they not only reflect current opinions among professional and
worker groups, but also help to focus the efforts of the
opposition where political parties are still restricted. 26 In
1937 examples of this kind of political mobilization have
28
consistently seen the opposition lists come out on top. Two of
the most significant associations have been the colleges o-f
lawyers and teachers.
Between 1974 and 1981 the executive o-f the college o-f
lawvers was appointed by the government, and in the first
elections in 1981, the right wing slate won a significant
victory. In early 1987 the combined slate of PDC and independents
won over 60/i with second place (30%) going to the centre-right.
The Renovation Nacional slate received just 9 percent. 27
Before the election of the national directorate o-f teachers took
place, many observers saw it as an important indicator of the
national mood because of the number of voters involved (65,000)
and the country-wide extent of the constituency. It was
significant then that, the slate under Osvaldo Verdugo, the PDC
and centrist candidate, won 47"/. and has since allied with the
third place socialist group which tallied 22'/.. Some, however,
have pointed to the 307. won by the government candidates as the
most significant outcome of the vote. It attests to the ability
of the government either to convince or intimidate even a fairly
sophisticated sector of the electorate which has been a favorite
target of the government.
The most recent gremial development has been the concerted
effort by the professors, with full support of the students via
strikes, of the University of Chile, to limit the intervention of
the government in university life. The universities have been
particularly hard hit since 1981 when the policy of self-
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financing came? into effect. Not only have students been forced
to withdraw because of lack of financial support but the number
of teaching hours have been reduced and the general level of
resources is inadequate. Students have held a number of strikes
over funding but the broader issue came to a head when Jose Luis
Federici, a person considered academically unqualified and
ruthless regarding budget cuts, was appointed to take over from
general Ricardo Soto who was sacked by Pinochet for his
sympathetic consideration of student and faculty demands. After
the professors continued to recognize the deans who were
democratically elected who, L n turn, were refusing en masse to
submit to Federici s demands for resignations, the new rector
closed the university. The closing wa= not respected by
students, staff or faculty, and has become a rallying point for
most of the opposition. The continuing student demonstrations,
where all political colors from the RN to the left for the first
time ar& on the same side in disciplined protest, have made the
university ungovernable. While Federici refers to the students
as "terrorists" and Pinochet attempted to forcefully control the
situation, the professors, deans and the university community
have received broad support. This was a battle that Pinochet was
anxious to win since he wants neither to be plagued by student
unrest during the campaign nor a precedent set that would upset
the economic plans already in place that limit social
spending. 28 By December, however, Pinochet gave into the
pressure and removed Federici.
o
Regarding the situation of unions, it has improved since
1983 in terms o-f -freedom to hold meetings, elections and in
numbers: -from a total of 500 recognized unions in 1983, the
number has jumped to 4,200 in 1987. Their capacity to -focus
political opposition, however, is severely limited by the -fact
that in 1986 this encompassed only 127. o-f the workforce, making
it very difficult to claim to represent all the workers and
successfully call for mass demonstrations. Still it is important
that 80"/. of the unionised workers Are members of the CNT (Comando
Nacional de Traba jadores) which made an effort to consolidate its
convocatory role with other groups in the Acuerdo Nacional. Its
latest independent effort, at a national strike on October 7 of
1987, the first since 1985, was not successful enough to initiate
a new wave of popular mobilization. It may again have greater
impact in co-ordination with other groups but thus far, for
example, it has been ambivalent in its support for the campaign
for free elections.
CgmQu ttees_f or_Free_Elect i_gns
The newest important specifically "political" entities on
the scene are the various committees for free elections. They
attempt to counter the skepticism regarding the plebiscite
process itself and the distrust of politicians in general, to
encourage people to register and become eligible to vote against
the government. After a slow start in March, the momentum is
picl ing up as more political and social groups publicly support
the effort. The fact that there Are four of these committees,
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however, reflects both the continuing high sense o-f party
identification in Chile and the inability o-f the opposition to
unifv its efforts in con-fronting the regime.
The -first to appear was the Committee for Free Elections
(CEL' under the leadership of Sergio Molina and consisting of 15
nationally repected political personalities. In June, two others
were formed: the Committtee of Political Parties for Free
Elections (COPPED, a committee of the political parties of the
Aliansa Democratica on the initiative of the PDC and Gabriel
Valdes; and the Committee of the Left for Free Elections (CIEL)
,
largely of the MDP parties with Ricardo Lagos of PS-Nunez as the
chai man. One of the additional aims of CIEL is to pressure the
cent: e and right parties to fight for the inclusion of the left
in the electoral process. COPPEL may be dissolving as a separate
entity in order to greater focus the centre-right under Molina as
the PDC wishes to concentrate its efforts on this issue. The
latest to appear is the Command for Popular Demands and Free and
Democratic Elections (CDP) . It is made up of leftist parties and
includes the PC and strongly advocates social mobilisation as a
necessary instrument of the political effort. One of the aims of
the committees has been to create groups that will spur on the
population at the local level. Members of the various committees
in Concepcion held a "symbolic vote" September 4-6, the
traditional day of Chilean elections, specifically asking voters
to express their preference for a plebiscite or free elections.
With a very high level of electoral participation, (i.e almost
45,000) 94"/. cast their vote in -favor of elections. The effort
received the support o-f the local archbishop, the unions, the
slum neighborhoods, and the local IU group, though it did not
participate, acknowledged its importance. All this was done
without interference o-f the military intendent, and because o-f
its success in avoiding violence, it is likely that similar
events will be held in other cities. 29
The_Church
In constrast to the CELs, the last actor seeking a
controlled transition has been around a long time, i.e. the
Catholic Church as represented by the hierarchy. It is
worthwhile giving some attention to the Church since according to
a number o-f polls, priest and bishops (along with teachers) Are
the most trusted leaders in the country, politicians being among
the lowest. 30 In addition to supplying legal, medical and
material support to victims of the regime, protective
environment -for union and academic activities etc.
,
it has spoken
out strongly on exile and other major issues. Regarding the
potentially co-optive visit o-f the Pope, the bishops succeeded in
maintaining control of the visit, not bending to government
pressure to change the intinerary more to Pinochet's liking.
Even Cardinal Fresno, who is politically less astute in
comparison to his predecessor was successful in bringing together
much of the opposition in the Acuerdo Nacional of 1985. It was
the best effort yet in presenting a united front to the regime.
Many political analysts in Chile feel that the Church has
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acquired much moral power among the population in general -from
its social role during the regime and that it thus has a great
potential to play a unifying role.
With Pinochet's refusal to even consider the Acuerdo
Nacional, however, Fresno has withdrawn from the political arena,
the result being a vacuum of leadership in Santiago and an
apparent paralysis of the Episcopate as a whole. Following the
government's swift and brutal response to the assassination
attempt on Pinochet in September 1986, the bishops issued a weak
statement asking the government to be "moderate" in its
application of the state of seige. Similarly Fresno went ahead
with the celebration of an annual mass that is always attended by
military officials despite protests from many in the Church that
the repression by the government, including summary executions,
should be strongly condemned. In contrast to the bishops, for
instance, the representatives of the laity meeting in their
annual conference in August (i.e. even before the assassination
attempt) had already issued a strong letter against the abuses of
the regime, stating that in no way could the government consider
itself either Christian or legitimate. 31 Again, seemingly
unaware of the impact of his actions, Cardinal Fresno was
prominently featured on television at La Moneda shortly after the
Pope's visit receiving an honor from Pinochet. Shortly
afterward, he flew to the Antartic, as representative of the
Pope, in the company of two members of the Junta, Generals
Matthei and Gordon. These actions seemed more jarring, perhaps,
since they -followed the rapid dismissal o-f the Vicar o-f Youth, P.
Andres Peret i atkowi cz immediately -following the pope's visit
because the youth representatives spoke very -frankly in the
National Stadium. These compromising actions give rise to the
fee] ing, on the par', o-f the grass-roots church at least, that the
hierarchy -for the must part has become an obstacle rather than a
support in defending themselves against the effects o-f the
regi me.
In contrast, a group o-f seven progressive bishops (with the
support o-f another six) met separately in Chilian outside
Santiago in October o-f 1986 and drafted a letter to the whole
Episcopate calling on their collegues to speak more clearly
against the abuses of the regime and not to abdicate their
leadership role though ambiguity. They warned that doing so only
cr^-ited paralysis within the Church and undermined the faith of
the people in the ability of the Church to represent them. This
thev felt was leading to the development of alternate authority
among the adults while driving the youth toward groups that
promote violence. 32
The Chilian meeting made public the split that had been
developing for some time among the bishops. This results in part
from the latest episcopal appointments, particularly the last two
in Santiago, Mons. Moreno and Medina, who Are known to be
sympathetic to the regime. This leaves Mons. Hourton alone in
that Archdiocese as a critic of the government, and he has taken
a leave of absence oi several months.
The most controversial figure in the Church at present is
not a member of the Chilean hierarchy but the Papal Nuncio,
Angelo Sodano who, in additon to his role in the selection o-f new
bishops (including the nomination o-f Fresno as prelate o-f
Santiago) has taken on many tasks not usually assumed by a papal
representative. Since his appointment in 1978, he has attended
most o-f the meetings o-f the Episcopal Conference, interferred in
the juri sdici t i on o-f at least two different zones of Santiago
regarding their pastoral orientation, and took a very active role
in the planning of the Pope's visit. He made an attempt to
censor the speeches to be given to the Pope by the
representatives of the poor so as not to create problems with
the government. As it turned out, they were not successful and
for the first time, clear criticism of the regime was broadcast
on national television.
The bishops have not fully utilized the opportunity
presented by the visit of Pope John Paul II. Although he did not
come out and condemn the regime while in the country, the Pope
did clearly support efforts toward full participation and the
need for justice and respect for human rights. At Par que
O'Higgins, for example, he urged all to work "toward the common
good and to develop all that assures conditions of justice, peace
and reconciliation ..." and that entails the "rejection of
violence and terrorism, wherever it comes from". And quoting
from 'Gaudium et Spes ' he urged that Chileans "build politico-
juridical structures that offer to all citizens without
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discrimination real possibilities -For actively and -freely taking
part in the ...election of those who govern them." 33
He had a tremendous impact on a personal level -for many,
calling them out o-f their cynicism and lack of hope and providing
the -first opportunity in fourteen years for Chileans to gather in
massive numbers in the streets without retaliation from the
police. He also made an extremely important move in meeting with
the representatives of all political parties, including the PC,
thereby supporting the legitimacy of all to participate in the
process toward democracy.
In the first session of the F'ermanent Committee of the
Episcopal Conference following the visit, however the bishops
were so divided on how to address the situation that they ended
up putting out a fairly weak statement. This is not to say that
the nishops have totally abdicated an intermediary role, only
that :t will not be as concerted as in the past. For example, a
month after the plenary session, the permanent executive issued a
long- -iwaited statement regarding the plebiscite. The bishops
added their collective weight to the efforts of the CELs
,
directly calling on all Catholics to register and to vote when
the time came. Several bishops, including Fresno, individually
called for the? same. The call to vote however, may prove more
problematic since the bishops did not pronounce on free elections
per se. Many members of the basic Christian communities in
Santiago and some of the workers see this as legitimizing the
Constitution, and even several bishops have said voting depends
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on what the process involves. In their meeting in August they
asked the government to meet with the various political
"currents" to modify the Constitution particularly Articles 8
and 24, and noted that -for the process (be it elections or
plebiscite) to be legitimate, a large percentage of the
electorate must be registered and all sectors o-f opinion must
have access to the mass media, including television. If the
hierarchy could unify its position and become more forceful in
its support for free elections, then the possibility of the
opposition defeating the official candidate in the plebiscite are
greatly enhanced.
Change_yi_a_MgbiLiizati on
The next sector of the political scene struggles not only for
a change of regime but also demands that the process include all
segments of the political spectrum with emphasis on social
mobilization. This inclusion and mobilization would, they
argue, ensure the Armed Forces' exit from direct political
control and significant change in the social and economic
priorities set by a new democratic government.
Probably the most important actors in this sector are the
Socialist and Communist Parties. Both have had a significant
place in Chilean politics, going back fifty and sixty-five years
respectively, and the Communist Party being the largest in Latin
America outside Cuba. Together, of course, they formed the basis
of Allende's Unidad Popular government, the last democratic
experience for Chileans. However, the predicament of this sector
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now is one o-f sectarianism and con-fusion - division within the
socialist camp regarding its identity and a -fundamental shift in
tactics by the PC.
The leadership o-f both groups was decimated by death,
disappearances and exile, and -from within by the doubts,
recriminations and self-criticism that -followed the coup that no
one anticiapted, at least in the severity in which it was carried
out. In 1979 the socialist party underwent a serious
-fragmentation into several small parties based on different ideas
for bringing an end to the dictatorship. By August 1987, the
majority of exiled socialist leaders, most notably Clodomiro
Almeyda and Aniceto Rodriguez, were home again and the key issues
were the viability of re-uniting the socialist parties (and the
timing whether it is better to do so before becoming part of any
unified opposition), and the relationship of the PC to the rest
of the opposition. There have been some efforts toward unifying
the left as a whole, not just the socialist parties, spurred on
by the return (March 1987) of Almeyda, ex -Chancel 1 or of the
Aliunde government. This has taken the form of the Izquierda
Unida, which includes the PC, with Almeyda as secretary general.
Because of fundamental differences between the PC and many of the
socialist factions over the registration issue and the
acceptability of violence as a political tool, the new leftist
front seems to be doomed to failure from its very inception.
Also, missing in the IU is the other major socialist party, PS-
Nunez, the "renovated socialists" against which Pinochet railed:
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it is more centrist than PS-Almeyda, seeing its role as an
intermediary between similarly-oriented socialists of the IU and
the PDC , helping the latter to understand the dilemma o-f the PC,
believing that without some kind o-f alliance between these two
major groups there will be no change o-f regime.
Almeyda's return saw the government, -for the -first time,
apply Article 8 to an individual. A-fter being relegated to 90
days o-f internal exile in the south, he was charged with several
crimes against the security o-f the state and kept in detention
a-fter his return to Santiago. Prominent citizens of many
di-f-fernt parties testified on his behalf and the way in which the
government handles the case will be an indication of its
intentions to enforce that article and the costs it will entail
for the image of the regime.
The PC made a major shift in its strategy in 1980 after
being outlawed by Pinochet's Constitution. It began supporting
"all forms of struggle" as legitimate in bringing down the
government. This has been a very costly stance since the FPMR to
which it is tied, has had no real success in either securing
broader popular support or in inflicting significant damage on
the regime via armed attacks, such as the September 1986
assassination attempt against Pinochet. In fact it has brought on
much more repressive measures from the government. The PC's
policy has become a major stumbling block to the parties of the
centre-left forcing them to exclude the PC from possible
alliances and preventing a stronger front to the government. It
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also gives the latter a convenient excuse to label all of the
opposition as dangerous. Again, although the PC -favors -free
elections it refuses to endorse the registration process as
encouraged by the commitees -for -free elections. An important
exception has been Maria Maluenda, an ex-par 1 ementari an who
defied the party directive and registered publicly on her own. It
is expected by some that the PC will distance itself from the
FPMP and/or give tacit support to other initiatives from any
centre-left alliance as it did at the time of the Acuerdo
Nacional. 34 To date the oppostion has not found the way out of
this impasse which impedes unity of the left and makes
impossible an alliance with the centre.
Virtually all sectors have failed to confront the
increasingly alien ted state of the people. The continued
sectarianism and delates over exclusively partisan issues, as if
the politicians were still living in a democracy, has led the
general population to believe there is no leadership or
sufficient political will in the opposition to move the current
regime. Not only i ; this sector economically and politically
represesed but, for the most part, alienated from the regime.
Acccrding the Church's National Commission of Justice and Peace,
in 1983 30"/. of the Chilean population could not meet the minimum
standard of living set by the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA). In 1987 their purchasing power was only 50'/. of
the 1970 level while unemployment averages 15"/. (including PEM,
Programa del Empleo Minino and POJH, Programa de Obra para Jefes
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de Hogares, the two government support systems) and 48"/. among the
youth o-f the slums of Santiago. PEM and POJH are included because
the wage received is not only below the national minimum but
workers o-f ten receive only half o-f their pay and no other form of
labour is permitted at the same time. These are gradually being
replaced by PIMO, Programas Intensivos en Mano de Obra, a joint
government-private enterprise scheme where the government pays
the entrepreneur to absorb some o-f the unemployment (i.e. free
labour). Much o-f the employment that is being created are
temporary jobs, without benefits and at very low wages.
Politically, the situation is tense at the base. Within
the poblaciones, -for example, it has been difficult for people to
get beyond individual responses to the serious problems (other
than emergency situations) which they face, resulting in an
atomi::ation that impedes the formation of viable local
structures. It is true that there have been hundreds of
organizations of various types (nutritional, recreational,
social, housing, ski 1 1 -trai ni ng workshops, and so on) that have
formed at the neighborhood level. This became notable as the
economic crisis of the early eighties became a prolonged reality.
For example, the Vicaria de Solidaridad under the Archbishop of
Santiago, which supports a large number of these, reported that
in 1986 there were over 2,500 such organizations in Santiago
under their auspices alone. However, many of these have had a
roller coaster existence. With a combination of minimal
satisfaction of needs (e.g. housing) and the continued use of
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violent response to any public protests, the government has kept
the organizational capability o-f the base at a low level. The
continued use o-f repression should not be underestimated. After
the major demonstrations o-f 1983, 1984 and 1986, the regime
responded with massive raids on poblaciones, arrests and
disappearance o-f neighbourhood leaders, states oi seige
prohibiting any local organization, and vicious personal attacks
(e.g. the murder o-f three professionals in 1984 and the burning
o-f two youths in 1986) that terrorized the protesters into
withdrawing -from the streets. The momentum o-f protest has yet to
be recovered. The latest human rights surveys indicate that the
situation in almost every category o-f abuse had become worse in
1986 than in the previous year, and it would seem that 1987 will
have a similar record. 35 The result has been tremendous
disenchantment, -fear and skepticism o-f any possibility o-f chance.
This awareness o-f being excluded -from participation in
various areas o-f national li-fe is most dramatic in the case o-f
youth. In the two major areas o-f education and work, the
position o-f the youth has become notably more marginal under this
regime. In 1973, 63 "/. o-f young people (ages 15-25) were able to
matriculate while in 1982 it had -fallen to 52"/..
Similarly Lin- and underemployment have reached very high
levels with about 1 million youth over 15 without productive
labor. And because o-f their strong participation in public
demonstrations, they account -for 75"/. o-f the injuries, tortures
and deaths. From the results o-f a study conducted in the
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poblaciones of Santiago by the Youth Vicariate of the Church,
their disenchantment is even deeper than that o-f their elders. It
is important to note, however, although more youths are being
attracted to groups like FPMR , the majority certainly do not see
violence as the primary alternative. Only 10"/. o-f the study
preferred parties o-f the extreme le-ft while 45 "/. opted -for
parties o-f either the centre or the right. 36
In 1985 it was estimated that 16"/. o-f the pobl adores
participated in some kind o-f organisation. In addition to the
subsi stance-styl e groups mentioned above, the hundreds o-f basic
Christian communities that have been developing over the past 20
years or so are another important organisational element in the
popular areas. Although most are mainly religious in their
orientation, many others are explicitly involved in the social as
well as religious dimension o-f communal li-fe. Their members too
have been the target o-f the government and suffered attacks on
houses, kidnappings, beatings, murders and exile. These
communities, numbering about 300, refer to themselves as the
"popular" Christian communities and are loosely organized under
the umbrella of a co-ordinating body. Unlike the bishops, they
fee] that the Church's mediating role has to come from its
commitment to those have most suffered the effects, both
political and economic, of the regime. 37 It is this particular
body which has been highly critical of the hierarchy's more
"diplomatic" rather prophetic condemnation of governmemt attacks
even on its own personnel at the grass-roots level. This
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re-flects the same elite/base split that characterises the general
political situation o-f the country. And there is, -finally, an
uneasy relationship, also, between the Christian communities in
general and local political groupings. Many Christian
communities -feel the political groups are superpol 1 1 i ci zed and
manipulated -from above while they in turn see the basic Christan
communities in general as being only partially committed to
political change.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly the greatest di-f-ference between the regime in
Chile today and Brazil and Spain when they initiated their
transitions is the ineluctable -fact that President Pinochet does
not want a transition. He has taken no measures to open or
liberalize politics, having instead maintained pressure
throughout the regime and acted skillfully to keep the opposition
o-f-f balance. He has recently reorganized his cabinet with an eye
to becoming the junta's candidate in, and subsequently winning,
the plebiscite. He also success-f ul 1 y maintains his support among
important economic and social groups, and enjoys the loyalty o-f
the armed -forces. As the president is not sponsoring a
transition, what o-f the oppositions' potential -for -forcing
Pinochet or the junta to initiate an opening which would result
in some -form o-f civilian solution?
We think this situation is unlikely. As indicated
throughout the text, the opposition agrees only on the need -for
Pinochet's departure and the return to a civilian regime. Beyond
this, each sector is not in agreement with other sectors nor even
internally on the strategy whereby a transition might be
promoted. Of greatest significance are the -fundamental splits
regarding the? role of mass mobilization. Each sector described
above is separated not only analytically but also politically on
this issue and others. Divided as they are, they do not
generate sufficient pressure to -force a transition nor to of-fer a
viable option should elements in the armed forces finally decide
that Pinochet should vacate power. While there are new
initiatives to form a common front, and some indications which
suggest possibilities for success, earlier promising efforts also
f ai 1 ed
.
Of particular concern today are two relatively new or at
least clearer facts. First, the Church, which has offered itself
and to which many civilian politicians look for a mediating role
in a transition, is openly divided concerning both a transition
and its possible role. Second, the masses of the population are
atomized with minimal organizational links among themselves and
bereft of links with the political parties. They are under such
pressure just to survive in increasingly difficult economic
conditions that they do not have the luxury to become organized,
and the regime actively discourages it in any case. In the
absence of a minimally unified opposition with links to the bases
of the society, Pinochet is able to continue to offer himself as
the only viable option to confusion and chaos. This has been his
strongest card all along and appears to remain convincing.
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